I
left it a while before blogging this, and I thought my moment had
passed, but today's news that MI5 had failed to renew their security certificate gave my thoughts a new lease of life. A furore greeted
the government's publication a few days ago of its plans for an
inoffensively named “Communications Capabilities Development
Programme” i.e. giving themselves the ability to spy on who you're
talking to and when and by what medium in real time without having to
ask anybody's permission. There was a rapid pull back when they
realised that they couldn't just push it through without anybody
noticing. Reaction in the LibDem half of the government was
satisfying. I sense some coalition politics going on here –
probably the Conservative half seeing how far it could get before the
LibDem half noticed or reacted. Hardly an inch, I'm pleased to say.
If you do nothing else today, you should sign the 38 degrees petition about it. Here's why.
Rather
than just looking at why we might be against these proposals, I want
to look at things we like, as Liberal Democrats, and assess whether the proposals match
those.
There
are things that Liberals are in favour of - things that work, respect
for people as individuals, respect for the power of the state, and a
relationship on which citizens control the state, not the other way
round.
Generally
speaking, liberal democracy being quite a pragmatic philosophy, we
are for things that work. So that translates into a question: how
workable is this idea?
Secondly,
we respect people, and therefore we respect data about them. How does
this idea deal with our data?
Thirdly,
we respect greatly the power of the state. It's only a tool, but it's
a massively powerful one that needs to be kept in check, otherwise it
can too easily wreck people's lives. So do these proposals apply
enough checks to the power of the state? (Some people might say they
fear the state. I don't, it's just a lot of people trying to do their
jobs. I'm just very, very careful with it, like I would be with a
loaded gun.)
Fourthly,
we like a system in which people are in charge of the state rather
than vice versa, one in which the state works on behalf of the
people, not on behalf of itself. Do these proposals do that?
So
first I look at these proposals in the light of things that work.
This falls into three categories - intrinsic worth, opportunity cost
and effectiveness.
Intrinsic
worth weighs the cost of doing it in both time and money. Given the
amounts of data that people produce, the storage costs will be
phenomenal. The biggest data drive I am aware of holds 120 petabytes(120 million gigabytes). The people on my twitter stream could fill
that in a week. Multiply that by everybody on Twitter, on Facebook,
on Flickr.... Massive data banks in massive buildings, all taking
space, all needing to fuelled, all needing to be maintained - the
costs will be astronomical. Then there will be the cost of finding
data. To track a single person means getting the data via their home
ISP, their mobile ISP, and any Internet cafés they use. The data
will have to be trawled out of all the billions of other messages. It
can be done by computers but there is still a cost. Estimates have
been made of the costs of a google search. If the security services
are incurring that kind of cost for every search they make, that cost
will also be significant. Is it worth it? Some would say security is
worth any cost, but our budget is limited and we need to choose what
to spend it on, which brings me to the next question.
Opportunity
cost means what else could we do with that money. The cost will mount
into billions over the years. No doubt the government will try to
avoid paying some of the cost by hiving it off on to the ISPs. There
is a limit to how far they can do that, and some hundreds of millions
will fall on the taxpayer. That money could arguably be spent much
better on other forms of policing. There is a role for data gathering
to play but it works best as an adjunct to intelligence led policing.
Knowing where to look for data is much more effective than a series
of fishing expedition. If the police aren't getting the intelligence
they need, then they should put more effort and more budget into it.
No guessing where I think that budget should come from.
Then
I question the effectiveness of the plan. The services will have at
their disposal a great deal of information about people like me, who
do not choose to disguise our whereabouts. Those who want to disguise
what they're doing need only go to local Internet cafés and create
extra gmail addresses. With only marginally more sophistication, they
will start to use the dark web, and be completely beyond the purview
of a scheme like this. The services will spend a mass of their time
investigating the innocent in the touching belief that they will
accidentally light on somebody guilty when anyone with a modicum of
nous will be able to subvert their surveillance with ease. It will be
a massive waste of their time, and of our security.
The
“does it work” test alone should see off this proposal. But there
are other issues - the integrity of our data for one. Of course the
services will assure us that our data is completely safe with them.
(MI5, where is your security certificate?) The Leveson enquiry should
have disabused us all of that one. Any system is vulnerable to both
corruption and hacking. Tabloid papers have been able to corrupt any
police officer or DVLA clerk they fancy. They won't turn a hair at
suborning data clerks in ISPs or whatever corrupt private
organisation the government chooses to give this responsibility to -
A4E perhaps (demonstrated to have big problems with corrupt practices
- still getting government contracts).
Anonymous
and others are daily showing that they can get round even hardened
security systems. Even a low level hacker with an axe to grind can
unlock data with frightening ease. It wasn't just a charity.
According to the Guardian, “Jeffery also admitted to detectives
that he had identified "vulnerabilities" on a string of
websites of major international organisations including the FBI, CIA,
West Midlands police, the Houses of Parliament, the US navy, Arizona
police and Spanish police.”
Mentally challenged people can get into the Pentagon, with very little
trouble. The existence of so much data on so many of us will be like
a honey pot to anyone who wants to do mischief. And they will
succeed. Our data will not be comprehensively protected.
_________________________________________________
And
while we're on the subject of Gary McKinnon, I cannot believe that:
a)
the government of the USA is so asininely blockheaded that it still
wants to prosecute him, rather than flying over here, shaking him by
the hand and thanking him for demonstrating so openly and
conclusively that they needed to take their own security more
seriously, and
b)
that Teresa May is so craven that she STILL hasn't told the Yanks
where to stuff it. A British citizen who, if he has committed a
crime, has committed it on British soil, should be tried in Britain.
A vulnerable British citizen even more so. She exercises no sense, no
reason and no compassion. You can tell her what you think at the Home Office contact page.
__________________________________________________
The
fact that our data will not be protected links to the third question
about the power of the state. When the state makes mistakes, the
results can be little more than annoying but they can also be
downright catastrophic. The Guildford four and the Birmingham six
will vouch for that. Jean Charles de Menezes will vouch for that. Today we hear about ex police constable Sultan Alam, who will vouch for that.The
opportunities for the state to make mistakes will be multiplied many
times if they are allowed to go on fishing expeditions without
having to account for and justify their interest in any specific
person. Even now without this legislation, the services want too
much. Trevor Timm says in “The UK government's war on internet freedom”: “According to their most recent Transparency Report,
Google refused to comply with 37 per cent of user data requests they
received from UK authorities in the first six months of 2011, because
they didn't comport with "the spirit or letter of the law",
likely indicating overly broad requests or that the authorities
provided no reasonable suspicion of a crime occurred.” They're
already fishing in more than a third of their requests.
Fourthly,
we stand for a particular relationship between the citizen and the
state. The state should be at the service of the citizenry, not the
other way round. It should be answerable to its citizens (and not
just once every five years). Citizens, not the state, are the most
valuable thing a country has. Citizens should have accessible and
practical means of control and redress. That gives rise to the
question: how would this proposal affect that relationship? It will
inevitably cause a distancing, particularly when the state finds
giving us information about it so distasteful (viz constant attempts
by many government organisations to block FOI requests).
This
also influences deeply the effectiveness of the proposals. Received
wisdom of policing is that it works by consent. If citizens do not
consent, policing does not work, because information and support
simply does not come the way of the police. That principle is formed
out of the principle of intelligence led policing, which is the most
effective kind. It requires the assistance and confidence of the
public at large in order for intelligence to flow towards the police.
As long as they are poking about in our data at their discretion,
they are, at least potentially, damaging the confidence in the which
they need in order to work most effectively.
There
may be some powers the services need – it may be sensible to ensure
that the scope of legislation is wide enough to encompass all forms
of internet communication when necessary, but never without good
reason and never without judicial oversight.
Thus,
on four counts these proposals fail. Sign the 38 degrees petition
about them – you need to keep your privacy in order for policing to
work its best.
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